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Abstract

This paper investigates the consequences of fiscal policies for the
exchange rate.

After developing a simple theory of how government financing

policies should effect the exchange rate, we test it using data on the
dollar/pound exchange rate.

Previous analyses have concentrated mainly on the

post-Bretton Woods flexible exchange rate system, thus ignoring potentially
useful information contained in fixed exchange rate periods or in previous
flexible exchange rate periods.

This paper shows that it is theoretically

proper and econometrically feasible to merge evidence from different nominal
exchange rate systems.

The gain of this procedure is that we can extend the

sample period back to the 1870's.

Our results suggest that permanent

government expenditures are the only fiscal variables that significantly
affected the dollar/pound nominal exchange rate.
irrelevant in this respect.

Budget deficits appear to be

1.

Introduction

That there exists a strong relationship between government policies and
the nominal exchange rate has long been recognized.

Monetary policies, in

particular, have been the object of several theoretical and empirical attempts
to explain exchange rate movements during periods of flexible exchange rate
regimes.

More recently, considerable effort has been devoted to the

understanding of exchange rate discontinuities caused by the collapse of fixed
exchange rate regimes.

Most of this theoretical and empirical work has

focused on the monetary causes of these exchange rate movements.

They all

stress the fundamental incompatibility of continuous inflationary policies
with the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate.
Even if monetary policies have been a prime subject of investigation,
little attention has been paid, either by the flexible exchange rate
literature or by the collapsing exchange rate literature, to the underlying
determinants of monetary policies.

This paper, on the other hand, explicitly

considers the rationale behind money supply decisions, by formalizing the link
between fiscal and monetary policy.

Inflation, in particular, is seen as the

result of the optimal financing of an exogenous stream of government
expenditures.
By stressing the role of inflation as a financing instrument, this
analysis provides useful insights into the understanding of the evolution of
the international monetary system.

At the basis of this approach is the idea

that both the dynamics of flexible exchange rates and the choice of exchange
rate regime are endogenous variables.

In this paper we take the view that

government spending is the fundamental exogenous variable driving both the
exchange rate (during flexible regime periods) and the switches between the
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two alternative exchange rate regimes.

A brief overview of the history of the

dollar/pound exchange rate reveals, in fact, an alternation of periods of
fixed exchange rates (during times of relative tranquillity in government
spending), and periods of flexible rates (during periods of high and divergent
level of expenditure).
The paper is organized as follows.

Section 2 presents a simple model in

which inflation, income taxes and deficits are the results of an optimal
government budget decision.

Section 3 derives the implications for exchange

rate behavior, and estimate the model using ordinary least squares.

Section 4

describes a variant of censored data techniques that can be fruitfully used in
this circumstance, and provides maximum likelihood estimates following this
approach.

2.

Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary of the results.

A Model of Optimal Seigniorage

In this section we describe a simple model in which the dynamics of
income taxes, seigniorage and government debt are the result of a rational
decision of the government seeking to finance a given flow of expenditure in
an optimal manner.

The model is close in spirit to work on optimal inflation

tax by Phelps (1973).

A similar approach is used by Mankiw (1987) to explain

the post World War II behavior of nominal interest rates in the U.S.
The intuition behind the model is quite simple.
different means of financing its expenditure:
deficits.

The government can use

income taxes, monetization or

The government has to choose the optimal mix of these instruments.

If the problem has an interior solution, part of expenditure is going to be
financed by money creation.
Consider an economy whose representative agent is interested in
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maximizing his expected lifetime utility, U, which is given by

u

where ct is the consumption at time t, and O < p < 1 is the discount factor.
Randomness in this economy is the consequence of stochastic government
spending and output, which will be introduced below.

The agents of this

economy have access to the international credit market, where real bonds bt
are traded at the world given interest rater that, for simplicity, is

1
postulated to be such that p -l+r·

The individuals are assumed to hold cash

balances in order to economize on the transaction cost of exchange.
Transactions are costly in the sense that a certain fraction of individual's
real income is used up in the transaction process.

This fraction, v, is a

convex function of the ratio of real balances held by the agent to his real
income, i.e.

v' < 0
v" > 0
0 <Vt< 1

where Pt is the price level and yt the exogenous real income.
agents are required to pay taxes rt in real terms.

1

In addition,

In order to capture in a

simple way the distortionary effects of income taxes, we assume that a
fraction of real income is absorbed in the tax collection process.

The

fraction, z, is a convex function of the ratio of taxes-to real income:

1

A similar approach is used by Greenwood (1983) and Kimbrough (1986).
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z' > 0
z" > 0
0 < zt < 1

Time t budget constraint is given by:

The individual optimization problem is therefore given by:

P-1

co

t
max
EO{ ~ f3 u(ct)}
t=O
ct' Mt

co

s.t.

~

t=O
co
~

t=O

(1!r) t{ ct + rt + vtyt + ztyt +

(::RJ mt}

(1!r) tyt

where mt are the real money balances, Rt is the nominal interest rate which
satisfies the Fisher equation (l+Rt) = (l+~t)(l+r) and ~tis the rate of
inflation.
In deriving problem

P-1 we also assume that b_ 1

0 and that the

usual transversality condition holds.
The first order conditions of this problem imply:

(2.1)
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(2.2)

Equation (2.1) is the well known random walk property of the marginal utility
of consumption, while (2.2) reveals that, since we assumed v" > 0, increases
in inflation are costly since they reduce desired cash balances as a fraction
of income.
The next step is to endogenize inflation by considering the optimization
problem of a government seeking to maximize the welfare of the representative
agent in the economy.

In this case the authorities will choose the paths of

inflation, taxes and deficits which minimize the cost of raising the revenue
necessary to finance their expenditures.

The period t budget constraint for

the government is given by:

Making use of the usual transversality condition, the government optimization
problem can be written as:

00

P-2

min EO{ ~ (1!rJt{v(mt/yt)yt + z(rt/yt)yt}}
t=O
rt' 1!'t

00

s.t.

~

t=O

(1!r) t{Gt - rt - ( 1:~Jmt}

For simplicity, define seigniorage St

0

Note that the marginal
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8v(t)
social cost of inflation is positive, i.e. - -->0.
8,rt

Moreover, we require the

objective function to be convex, which implies z">0, as assumed, and

- - - > 0.

The first order conditions for this problem are given by:

z' (t)

Et{z'(t+l)}

Et

(2.3)

z, (t)

(2.4)

8v(t+l)

av(t)

a1rt+l

8,rt

ast+l

ast

a1rt+l

8,rt

(2.5)

As (2.3) reveals, the solution of this problem involves equating the
ratios of the marginal cost to the marginal revenue of the two alternative
financing instruments (since output is exogenous, the marginal revenue of
income taxes is one in this model). The optimum must be in the positively
sloped side of the inflation tax Laffer's curve, where the marginal revenue
from money creation is positive, i.e.

ast
8 ,rt

> 0.

Equation (2.4) equates the

ratio of marginal cost to marginal revenue of the income tax today and in the
future.

Equation (2.5) does the same for the inflation tax.

In the special

case in which taxes are not distortionary, i.e. z = 0, the solution to P-2
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reduces

av(t)

0

Rt
Since condition (2.2) implies that in equilibrium -v'(·) = l+R, the optimal
t

policy is to set inflation in such a way that Rt= 0.
optimum quantity of money rule.

This is Friedman's

In this case seigniorage will be nil, and

government expenditure will be financed only through taxes.

The opposite

extreme is one in which inflationary policy is non-distortionary, i.e. v = 0.
In this case, as long as the marginal revenue from money financing is
positive, taxes will be set to zero.

In the intermediate case in which both

types of financing are distortionary, we would expect that both will be used
to assure solvency.
In a recent paper, Kimbrough (1986) challenges the view that seigniorage
should be part of an optimal tax policy.

He argues that, even if taxes are

distortionary, Friedman's optimal quantity of money rule should be followed.
In his model, inflation decreases the potential output of the economy, by
reducing the individual's time endowment (an hypothesis analogous to the one
we made above).

On the other hand, he assumes that the only alternative

financing instrument is a consumption tax, which does not have the same direct
negative effect on the production possibility frontier (it alters the marginal
choice between consumption and leisure, but does not affect the total time
endowment).

Because of this asymmetry, in that model it is optimal to refrain

from raising revenues through seigniorage.
In our model, instead, taxes and inflation lead to a similar contraction
of potential output, so that they are both used as financing instruments.
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Moreover, because of the deadweight losses imposed by taxes and inflationary
finance, in our environment it is optimal to use deficits as a buffer for
temporary deviations of government expenditure from its permanent level.
Income taxes and inflation should be used to finance only the permanent part
of government expenditure, a generalization of the well-known tax smoothing
result obtained by Barro (1979).

This result can be derived explicitly, by

assuming that the ratio of seigniorage to output can be expressed as a linear
function of inflation:

and that v(t) is a quadratic function of inflation:

V

a+
a 2 11'2t.
1

Then, inflation, as well as the nominal interest rate and seigniorage, is a
martingale.

The same is true for the income tax rate, under the assumption

that z(t) is quadratic 2

•

Making use of the expectation operator, and assuming

for simplicity that the relevant covariance terms are equal to zero, we can
manipulate the government budget constraint at period t to give:

j
h(__.!_)EG

<X)

(l+r)Bt-l +

j=O l+r

t t+j

= h
<X)

Jj[{ ["

- 1
j=O l+r
(

·J

E __!±J_ +E
t Yt+j

[s ·]} E
__!±J_

t yt+j

tYt+j

l

(2.6)

By assuming that output is a random walk and using the martingale properties

2

See Mankiw (1987) for a similar result.
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of seigniorage and income tax, (2.6) can be written as:

(2.7)

where G~ - [1:r) j~0[1!r)jEtGt+j·
We can interpret the left-side ratio as the expected permanent fraction
of output consumed by the government.

As long as problem P-2 has an interior

solution, increases in this ratio imply increases in the rate of inflation,

3.

Implications for Exchange Rate Behavior and Empirical Application

Consider a foreign country which is in all ways analogous to the domestic
economy. 3

The exchange rate and the price levels in the two countries are

assumed to be linked by:

(2.9)

e, p, p * are the logarithms of nominal exchange rate, domestic and foreign
price level, respectively.

In accord to a considerable body of empirical

evidence, we also assume that the deviations from purchasing power parity are
permanent in nature, i.e.:

3

Here we still maintain the assumption that the real interest rate is world
determined and cannot be effected by either of the two economies.
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(2.10)

where Elt is iid.

We can now express the rate of change of the exchange rate

(2 .11)

where g~s and g~k represent the U.S. and U.K. ratios of permanent government
expenditure to output, respectively.
We now investigate whether the effects of fiscal policy on exchange rate
predicted by the above model can be detected for the dollar/pound rate.

The

data set used in this study is composed of annual observations, for the period
1870-1984.

We argued above that temporary expenditure should be financed

through budget deficits.

Therefore, empirically we identify the temporary

component of expenditure with the real deficit, defined as:

-

B
t-1
-pt-1

(3.1)

where Bt is the amount of government bonds outstanding at time t.

The

permanent component is given by the difference between the actual real
expenditure and its temporary element. 4
We included in the specification not only permanent expenditures but also

4

In this paper we used government expenditure of the central government,
inclusive of interest payments and net of transfers The results, however, are
quite robust with respect to the choice of spending aggregate. Debt is total
debt outside the central bank. Appendix B provides a detailed description of
the data.

11

budget deficits as a percentage of output (d , d k).
us
u

This allows us to test

whether, contrary to the above theory, they have had any effect on the
exchange rate.
(r

us

, r k).
u

We also include government receipts as a percentage of output

The above model predicts that, once we control for permanent

spendings, government revenues should not have any independent effect on
inflation (exchange rate).

However, unexpected shifts in the relative welfare

cost of the two financing instruments (i.e. changes in the z() and v()
functions) would induce switches between income taxes and inflation, for given
permanent government expenditure (see 2.3).

Under these circumstances,

increases in revenue would imply a reduction in inflation and have an
appreciative effect on the exchange rate.

The estimated exchange rate

equation had, therefore, the following form:

(3.2)

where Elt is assumed to be independently normally distributed.
The time series of the exchange rate for this sample is plotted in Figure
1.

As it is well known, and as Figure 1 evidences, periods of fixed exchange

regimes have alternated with periods of flexible rates.

In table 1, we report

the estimate of (3.2) obtained by using only data corresponding to periods of
flexible exchange rates.
the expected signs.

Both permanent expenditures are significant and have

Moreover, U.S. revenues appear to have had a significant

(appreciative) effect on the dollar, indicating that shifts in the relative
cost function may have occurred in the U.S ..
Even if our data set extends over 115 years, the above estimate are based
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only on 25 data points.

This is because, for most of the sample, the exchange

rate was fixed, making it difficult to detect the effects of changes in
government expenditure.

In the next section it will be shown how to improve

our estimates by properly utilizing the information contained in periods of
fixed exchange rates.

For the moment, however, assume that one ignores the

problem of the existence of periods of fixed exchange rates, and uses ordinary
least squares to estimate equation (3.2) over the whole period 1870-1984.
results of this experiment are reported in Table 2.
similar to the one obtained above.

The

The results are very

Both U.S. and U.K. permanent expenditures

have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero at least at
the 5% level.

Of the other variables, U.S. government revenues seem to have a

significant impact on the exchange rate.

4.

Censored Regression Models With Unobserved Thresholds

During period of fixed exchange rates, variations in permanent
expenditure would not be reflected in exchange rate changes.

This does not

imply, however, that the study of these periods cannot provide any useful
information about our theory.

On the contrary, the type of exchange rate

system may be itself a function of the level of government expenditure.
Periods of moderate spending (taking the conditions in the other country as
given), and therefore of moderate monetization, can be compatible with a fixed
parity.

On the other hand, continuous or substantial increases in permanent

expenditure may undermine the viability of a fixed exchange rate system,
producing its collapse and a switch to a floating regime.

For example, if we

divide the observation into two groups depending on whether they belong to
periods of fixed or flexible exchange rates, we notice that, while the U.S.
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has essentially the same average level of expenditure in the two subsets (6.5%
of output during fixed and 8.1% during flexible rates) the U.K.'s average
expenditure is considerabl y higher during flexible rate periods (15.5% vs.
22.1%).
The issue of collapsing exchange rate regimes has been extensively
analyzed by the speculative attack literature. 6

The focus there is to

determine the timing and the magnitude of a devaluation (revaluatio n), which
is seen as the consequence of an attack on the official reserves by rational
speculators .

One of the main insights of this literature is that the crucial

variable determining a switch from fixed to flexible exchange rate regime is
the shadow exchange rate,

i.e. the equilibrium exchange that would prevail in

the post-collap se floating regime.

Assuming that only a dollar revaluation is

possible (as it has been the case in our sample), we can describe the
condition for the viability of a fixed exchange rate as:

(4.1)

s
i.e., the rate of growth of the shadow exchange rate (~et)
must be above some

minimum level (~e~in).

By definition, in a flexible exchange rate regime the

shadow and the actual rate coincide , i.e. ~e~ = ~et.

If the shadow rate were

observable during the period of fixed rate, we could estimate (3.2) by using
such data.

The problem is that the floating shadow is not observable during

fixed exchange rate regimes, since ~e~ is observable only if:

6

See, for example, Flood and Garber (1984), Blanco and Garber (1986), Grilli

(1986).
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!:le~< llemin

Therefore, in part of the sample Et does not have zero mean.
that the OLS estimates are both biased and inconsistent.

This implies

The way in which we

propose to estimate (3.2) is to consider

as a censored regression (xlt is the 7 x 1 vector of the fiscal variables, and
p

1

min
is the 7 x 1 vector of parameters) where the threshold !:let
, above which

the data are censored, is itself unobservable.

It is assumed, however, that

we observe the variables determining it, that is:

where x t is a vector of observable variables.
2
sample observations into three distinct groups.

It is useful to partition the
The first group is composed

of N observations referring to fixed exchange rate periods.
1

The only

information that we have for these observations is that /:le~> !:le~, i.e. (El I

I

E2) > P2x2 - plxl.
The second group is composed of N observations referring to the periods
2
in which a collapse of the system and a revaluation of the exchange rate
occurred.

In this case we know that a collapse occurred because !:les < !:lemin
t

I

that is: (E

1

t

I

- E ) < p x 2
2 2

P1x 1 .

The last group is composed of N observations referring to the flexible
3
exchange rate periods.
s

with !:let.

In this case we freely observe !:let which coincides

'
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Assuming that (E ,
1
covariance matrix

are normally distributed with mean zero and

0

al2]

2
a2

,

we can write the logarithm likelihood

function for this problem as:

,

,

Log{L(p , p , O)}
1
2

(4.2)

where~ and~ are the density function and the distributio n function,
respectivel y, of the standard normal, and a 2 =

a

1

+ a

2

- 2a
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.

In order to

obtain consistent estimates to use as starting values in the maximum
likelihood procedure, we used a variant of a two-stage method described by
Maddala (1983).

A description of this estimator is given in Appendix A.

The estimates of the parameters obtained by maximizing (4.2) are given in
Table 3, where x

2

is composed of the lagged difference between the ratios of

permanent expenditure s to output of the two countries (~g) and the fixed
parity (e).

These maximum likelihood estimates would seem to support the

theory of optimal financing as a partial explanation of the movements of the
Dollar/Poun d exchange rate between 1870 and 1984.

In fact, the two permanent

expenditure ratios are both significant and have the expected sign.

A one

percent increase in the ratio of U.S. permanent expenditure to output induces
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a three percent devaluation in the dollar.

On the other hand, a one percent

increase in the ratio of British permanent government expenditure to output
revalues the dollar by almost one percent.

U.S. revenue, on the other hand,

seem to have lost part of their explanatory power.

5.

Conclusions

A novel aspect of this paper is the choice of the time period in which
the empirical investigation is conducted.

Previous studies have mainly

concentrated on the post Bretton Woods flexible exchange rate system.

In this

paper, we make use of econometric techniques that exploit information
contained in data from periods of fixed exchange rates. Thus, our empirical
analysis ranges from the 1870's to the 1980's.

The study of this extended

time period is of particular importance since major changes in the nominal
exchange rates seem to be connected with major changes in government
expenditure, like the ones occurring during war times.
The results of this paper suggest that the permanent components of public
expenditures have been a crucial factor in driving the evolution of the
dollar/pound rate in the last hundred and fifteen years.

U.S. revenues also

contribute to the explanation of exchange rate movements, indicating possible
changes overtime of the welfare cost of alternative financing instruments.
Moreover, the paper provides further evidence in favor of the thesis of
irrelevance of budget deficits in the determination of nominal variables.
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Appendix A

First we obtained consistent estimate of p

I

1

and u

1

OLS using only the N observations of flexible rates.
3

by estimating (3.2) by
Next, from the probit

model based on the dichotomous variable I (which takes value 1 for the N
2
I

observation and O for the N observation) and
1

I

P2x2 - P1x1
u

, and from using the

I

I

OLS estimate of the p s, we obtained consistent estimates for u and p .
1
2
other two parameters, u

2

and u

12

The

, do not appear in the log likelihood

functions, so that they are not estimable by maximum likelihood.
can obtain consistent estimates in the following way.
observations, i.e. the ones referring to a revaluation.

However, we

Consider the N
2
In this sample we

know that des< bemin, i.e.
I

I

P2x2-P1xl

<-----

u

u

P'x.

Therefore, if we run OLS on

we would obtain biased estimates since e

1

is not zero mean in this sample.

However, we can control for this, by noting that:

I

E(e1 ,e3

where u

~

p x)

2
ul - ul2
13

u

</>(P'x)
-ul3 <l><P'x)

Therefore, we can run OLS on

21

where ut has now zero mean.

From the estimate of a

13

we can derive a

Finally, using a= a 2 + a 2 - 2a
we can derive an estimate for a .
1
2
12
2

12

.
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Appendix B

This appendix provides a detailed description of the data sources. All
data are centered on the end of June up to 1976, and the end of September
thereafter.
1.
l.A.

GNP Statistics
United States

l.A.l

Real GNP, in 1929 dollars
1870-1888
Christina Romer [1986]
1889-1908
Historical Statistics of the United States
Series F3
1909-1976
National Income and Product Accounts Table:
Table 1.22 and 1.2
1977-1984
Internation al Financial Statistics, Series 99A.R.

l.A.2

Deflator, 1929 = 100
1870-1975
Ratio of nominal to real income from Friedman and
Schwartz (1982), Table 4.8
1976-1984
Net National Product Deflator from Survey of
Current Business

l.A.3

Nominal GNP
1870-1888
1889-1908
1909-1976
1977-1984

l.B.
l.B. l

Estimated as real GNP* Deflator
Historical Statistics of the United States Series
Fl
National Income and Product Accounts Tables
1.22 and 1.1
Internation al Financial Statistics, Series 99A

United Kingdom
Nominal GNP
1870-1965
1966-1984

Capie and Webber (1985), Table III.12
Annual Abstract of Statistics V.112 T.337
and V.121 Tl4.8 and V.122 Tl4.8

l.B.2

Deflator, 1929=100
1870-1965
Capie and Webber, Table 111.12
1966-1984
Ratio of Real GNP to Nominal GNP from Annual
Abstract of Statistics, V.112 T.337,
V.121 Tl4.8, V.122 Tl4.8

l.B. 3

Real GNP, in 1929 pounds
1870-1984 Calculated as the ratio of Nominal GNP to Deflator
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2.

Public Finance Statistic s

2.A.

United States

2.A.l

Federal Governmen t Expenditu re
1870-1970
Historica l Statistic s of the U.S.
Tables Y336, Y472
1971-1984
Statistic al Abstract of the U.S. 1986
Table #491

2.A.2

Federal Governmen t Debt
1870-1970
Historica l Statistic s of the U.S. Table Y488
1971-1984
Statistic al Abstract of the U.S. Table #491

2.B.

United Kingdom

2.B.l

Central Governmen t Expenditu re
1870-1938
Mitchell and Dean
1939-1965
Mitchell and Jones
1966-1984
Annual Abstract of Statistic s, V. 107 T320,
Vlll T352, Vl22 Tl6.4

2.B.2

Total National Debt
1870-1939
Mitchell and Dean, TS
1940-1966
Mitchell and Jones, T3
1967-1973
Economic Trends, May 1977 Pl06
1974-1984
Annual Abstract, 1986 Tl6.3

3.

Monetary Aggregate s

3.A.

United States

3.A.l

Monetary Base
1870-1960
Friedman- Schwartz Table B-3
1961-1984
Reserve Money, Internati onal Financial
Statistic s, Series 14

3.A.2

Official Reserves
1878-1909
National Monetary Commissio n, T4
1910-1913
Commerci al and Financial Chronicle
1914~1941
Banking and Monetary Statistic s, Vl, Tl60
1942-1970
Banking and Monetary Statistic s, V2, Tl4.l
1971-1982
Annual Statistic al Digest, various
1983-1984
Federal Reserve Bulletin, various

3.B.
3.B.l

United Kingdom
Monetary Base
1870-1982
Capie and Webber
1983-1984
Bank of England Querterly Bulletin
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3.B.2

4.

Official Reserves
1870-1879
Miscellaneo us Statistics of the UK, Board of
Trade
1880-1887
Bankers Magazine
1888-1909
National Monetary Commission
1910-1918
Bankers Magazine
1919-1927
League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of
Statistics
1928-1931
Banking and Monetary Statistics
1932-1939
Bankers Magazine
1946-1984
Internation al Financial Statistics

Exchange Rate, Dollars per Pound
1870-1890
Commercial and Financial Chronicle
1891-1909
National Monetary Commission
1910-1953
Commercial and Financial Chronicle
1954-1984
OECD, Main Economic Indicators

25

Table 1
OLS Estimate: Flexible Exchange Period
(T-Statisti c in Parenthesis )
0.044
(0.023)

C

p

gus

6.317
(2.381)

p

guk

-0.995
(2.579)

d

us

-2.304
(1. 503)

duk

0.178
(0.573)

r

us

-2.752
(1. 924)

ruk

-0.164
(0.184)

2
Adj. R = 0.32
DW = 1.60
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Table 2
OLS Estimate: 1870-1984
(T-Statistic in Parenthesis)
0.018
(1. 258)

C

1.257
(3.782)
-0.287
(2.453)
d

us

-0.392
(1.751)
0.147
(1. 508)

r

us

-0.759
(2.479)

ruk

-0.056
(0.238)

2
Adj. R = 0.13
DW = 2.13
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Table 3
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
(T-Statistic in Parenthesis)

{Jl
0.159
(1.130)

C

p

gus

3.393
(2.064)

p

guk

-0.804
(2.128)

d

us

-0.244
(0.375)

duk

0.053
(0.188)

r

us

-1.476
(1. 706)

ruk

-0.330
(0.579)

a

al

0.083
(1. 399)
0.095
(5.658)
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